INTRODUCTION
The status of the relationship between genetieally modified organisms (GMOs) and the trade related to them has become a crucial issue. While the questions of access to genetic resources and of the sharing of their financial benefits often position northern and southern c.ountries on opposing sides, trade in G.MOs creates new confliets. Here, the confrontation is primarily transatlantic, between the USA, wishing to export a growing yield of genetically modified (TOps, and the EU, wishing not to receive them. 1 The USA and the EU, which are the two prineipal protagonists of world trade, have thus adopted completely opposite legal strategies.
The profound differences in the legal treatment of international trade of GMOs between the Member States of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have given rise to various disputes. In 2000, the flrst com plaint dealing with trade in GMOs was commenced at the W'l'O. The request concerned the prohibition imposed by Egypt on the import of canned tuna from Thailand, suspected of being packed in genetieally ' However, several developinq countries have also expressed tt1eir con·· cerns, in particular with reqard to the socio-economic consequences of the development of biotechnoloqy in the field of aqricultum. See 'La Chine engage une epreuve de force avec les E:tats··Unis sur l'importation de soja genetiquement modifie' et 'Les petits pays reticents aux OGM subissent de fortes pressions de Washington', Le Monde (Tuesday, 15 January 2002) , at 4. See f~equest to Join Consultations, Communication from Chile, WTIDS291/11 (13 June 2003), at 1:
.. The United States dmllenges the moratorium on the approval of biotech products applied by the E:uropean Communities since October 1998 and the marketing and import bans on such products maintained by some of its Member States. De facto import bans rnean that substantial trade interest cannot be defined on the basis of trade volume, only on future expectations. Chile also has a substantial systemic interest in the propror implementation of the WTO Agreements, in particular tile General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. The improper application of the disciplines of these A(:Jreements has trade implications for a country such as Chile. Finally, the direction taken by this dispute will prove significant for developing countries which, like Chile, are studying and evaluating national biotechnology policies. including renulations on the import, rnarl<eting, US(J, label inn and traceability of Genetically Modified Orqanisms (GMOs) and food containinq GMOs '. modified soybean oiF This complaint was resolved through consultations between Egypt and Thailand. 'I'his was followed in August 200:3, when the USA decided to request the establishment of a WTO dispute-settlement panel to determine the compatibility of the so-called European de facto moratorium on GMOs with WTO rules.:
1 'I'he actual dispute began in May 200:3 when the USA, Argentina· 1 and Canacla
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' Egypt··-Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil, Re·· quest for Consultations by Thailand, WTIDS20511 (27 September 2000) . 3 In this article, we will not focus on the question of whether the so-called moratorium is a measure or a simple practice. We will base our analysis on the presumption that the de facto moratorium is a measure that can be brought under dispute in the WTO. In addition, due to the uncertain character of the E:uropean moratorium, the article will not deal with the issue of the so-called moratorium beinq a 'technical regui<Jtion' or not under the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement.
European Communities --Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products. Request for Consultations by Argon· tin a, WT/DS293!1 (21 May 2003), at 1: 'As a rJiobal producer and exporter of biotechnology products, for Argentina the systemic and trade implications of the aforementioned measures constitute a clear nullification or impairment of its rights under the WTO Anreements. Since 1998, the European Communities has suspended consideration of applications for approval of biotechnoloqy products. In addition, some of their rnernber States have introducEJd prohibitions, even infringing Community rules for biotechnology products. In effect, Argentina indicates that the action by the European Communities is detrimental to international trade in biotechnology products, as can be seen from the following: (a) de facto measures leading to the suspension of consideration or the nonconsideration of various applications without sufficient scientific evidence or a proper risk assessment; and (b) undue delay in finalizing consideration of various applications for approval of biotechnology products submitted by various WTO Members. This action affects biotechnology products approved for marketin() in Argentina .. Canada, WTIDS29211 (21 May 2003) , at 1: 'As a result of measures taken by EC Member States, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greeco, Italy, l_uxembourg, the Nether·· lands, and Sweden, since 1998, the E:C has maintained a de facto moratorium on the approval of GM products. The moratorium prevents GM products from accessin9 or proceeding through the E:C's approvals process. As a consequence of the moratorium, Canadian GM products have been blocked at various stages of the EC's approval process. In addition, some EC Mernber States, including Austria. France. Greece, and Italy have prohibited the importation and rnarkf.lling of Gi\11 products despite those products having been approved by the EC for importation and marketing'. MOiSE MBENGUE F<ECIEL 13 (3) 2004 requested formal consultations at the WTO on this subject/' arguing that the de j(Jclo European Community (EC) Jnoratnrinrn on imporlo: nf (~M Os sirwe 1999 arose rather out of trade protectionism than from concerns for consumer health or for the environment.
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In their request for consultations/ the USA stated that, since October 1998, the EC has applied a moratorium on the approval of biotech products and thus has suspended consideration of applications for biotech products under the EC approval system, as well as the granting of their approval. The USA argued that a number of applications for placing biotech products on the market had been blocked in the approval process under EC legislationH and have never been considered for final approval. It argued that the approvals moratorium has restricted imports of agricultural and food products from the USA."
Moreover, the USA considered that tbe Member States of the EC maintained a number of national marketing and import bans on hioteeh produets, even though those products have already been approved by the EC for import into, and marketing in, the EC. The national marketing and import bans have restricted imports of agricultural and food products from the USA. According to the USA, these measures appear to be inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs EU's re(Julatory system for GMos· authorization is in line with WTO rules: it is clear, transparent and nondiscrimin<Jtory. There is therefore no issue that the WTO needs to examine. The US claims that there is a so-called 'moratorium' but the fact is that the EU has authorized GM varieties in the past and is currently processing applications. So what is the real US motive in bring in() a case?" David Byrne, EU Commissioner for Health and Consumer protection stated: "We have been working hard in Europe to complete our regulatory system in line with the latest scientific and international developments. Ttle finalization process is irnmimJnt. This is essential to mstore consumer confidence in GMOs in Europe''. Mr. Byrne recalled that it is the lack of consumer demand for GM-products that accounts for the low sales of GMOs in the EU rnarket. "Unless consumers see that the authorization process is up to date and takes into account all le9itirnate concerns, consumers will continuo to remain sceptical of GM products". EU Commissioner for the Environment Mar(JOt Wallstrom added: "This US move is unhelpful. lt can only make an already difficult debate in Europe rnoro difficult. [3ut in the rm)antime, the Commission strongly believes that we in Europe should move ahead with completin(J our le9islation on traceability and labellin9 and on food and feed, currently [)()fore the European Parliament. We should not be deflected or distracted from pursuin9 the right policy for the EU" '. The press release is available <lt <http://europa.eu.int/cornm/trade/(Joods/a(Jri/ pr130503 en.lltm>. Communities can only regret that the Complainants have chosen to start a dispute settlement procedure based on flawed prernises. rather than to promote international cooperation as a means to build a sound international framework for addressing the GMO issue.u (italics in original)
As goods, GM Os are subject to the disciplines of WTO law. 'fhe methods of its application, however, are neither simple nor obvious, due to both the diversity of GMOs and the risks that they arc capable of carrying, and to the plurality of restrictive trade measures to which they can give rise. What is more, the WTO system itself, which is constituted through a series of different agreements, is complex. As noted above, trade in GMOs could be assessed, depending on the ease, according to the SPS Agreement, TBT Agreement, or even according to GATf 1994. Assessment must be made on a case-by-case basis, according to the GMO in question and the risks it carries (sanitary and/ or environmental). Without question, the interplay between the agreements of the WTO themselves on an issue such as that of GMOs is not clear and adds further complexity to their status under the WTO.
'l'he relationship between GM()s and trade gives rise to several important legal issues, which will be exam-· ined in turn in light of the different scenarios that manifest themselves in the EC -Biotech Cuse.
ISSUES ARISING FROM GATT 1994
Several scenarios can be imagined in the relationship between GMO regulations · · · · · be they national or international -and GATT 1994: violation of the mostfavoured -nation clause (Article I of GATr 1994); violation of the national treatntent rules (Article III of GArr 1994); or violation of the prohibition on quanti·· tative restrictions (Article XI of GATT 1994 ). Nevertheless, the scenario that seems to be the most obvious and the most complicated to understand is that of the violation of national treatment. Indeed, it would seem logical to ask ourselves the vital question of whether the prohibition on importing GMOs constitutes a violation of Article Ill of GATr 1994, due to the discrimination that would result for non-GMO products. The issue of likeness between GMO products and nonCl\110 products arises before our eyes. Then, in case we can assume that there is a true violation of Article 111 of CATT 1994 based principally on discrimination between like products, another scenario remains to be envisaged -that of Article XX of GATT 1994 as an exception justifying the violation of Article IIL 
GMOS AND NON-GMOS: ARE THEY 'LIKE PRODUCTS'?
The fundamental purpose of Article Ill is to avoid protectionism in the application of internal tax and regulatOly measures. More specifically, the aim of Article III 'is to ensure that internal measures "not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production'''.H To this end, Article III obliges members of the WfO to provide equality of competitive eonditions for imported products in relation to domestic products. Some countries may allege that the GMO import regulations violate Article III(4) of GATr 1994. Article III(4) of GATT 1994 reads as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be ae(;orcled treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. 'I'he provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product Three cumulative elements need Lo be satisf]ecl in order for a violation of Artide Ill( 4) to be established: (i) the imported and domestic products at issue are 'like products'; (ii) the measmes at issue are 'laws, regulations, or requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use'; (iii) lhe imporled products are accorded 'less favourable' treatment than that accorded to like clomeslic products. 16 As these criteria are cumulative, the fact that one is not satisfied is sufficient to condude that Article Ill(4) of GATT 1994 has not been violated.
Regarding likeness, the fundamental question is simply whether the imported GMO products and domestie non-GMO products (i.e. conventional products) are 'like products'. In the EC Biotech dispute, the USA, Canada and Argentina are proceeding on the basis that there is no difference between GM products and It is even more pertinent in the case of GMOs clue to the proteifonn character of the notion of GM Os per se. Clearly, a GM.O is an organism in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/m· natural recornbination. In different fora, GM Os are referred to as 'living modilied organisms' (Ll\!!Os), w 'genetically engineered organisms' and 'transgenic organisms'. Although this palette of terminology refers to the same or similar processes, it may seem dillic:ult to conclude that they are perfectly alike.
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Without dwelling upon the regulatory implications of the use of the concept of substantial equivalence/ 0 two key elements could be taken inlo account to illustrate that GMO products are not 'like' non-GMO products. One element is procedural and the other is material.
Regarding the procedural element, the international community has, through the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety/ 1 recognized that GM products are such that they require their own, distinct authorization procedure.22 Indeed, for the transboundary movement of some l.MOs/ 3 the Biosafety Protocol requires the parties to follow the procedure of advance informed agreement (AIA)." . .
1 AIA consists of three steps: notification; acknowledgement of notification; and decision. The party of export has the obligation to notify in writing the party of import prior to the intentional transbounclary movement of an LM0.
2 " The party of import has different options: to approve the import without conditions; to approve the import with conclitions; to prohibit the import; to request additional information; or to extend the proeedure by a defined period of time.
26 In the event that there is a lack of scientific certainty regarding the extent of potential adverse effects, the party of import retains the right to take a cleeision in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects. 'I'hc procedural aspect thus illustrates that GM products are specific products and arc not subjected to the same legal regime as non-GM produets.n This is the first distinguishing element to suggest that they arc not 'like' products.
A relevant material clement relates to the potential risks linked to the spread of GlVIOs in the environrnent and to the consumption of GM Os. The LJK's Science Review Panel also said:
To date worldwide there have been no verifiable untoward toxic or nutritionally deleterious effects resulting from the cultivation and eonsumption of products from GM crops. However, absence of readily observable adverse effects does not mean that these can be completely ruled out and there has been no epiclemiologieal monitoring of those consuming GM food.:"'
'fhese risks of 'harm' or 'danger' linked to the dissemination or consumption of GMOs are essential in the analysis of the likeness between Gl\11. products and conventional products. In the European Communities Measures ;Vj(x:ting Asbestos and Asbestos-ContoiniT1g Products Case, one of the key contributions of the WTO Appellate Body was the development of law relating to criteria for establishing likeness between produets.:ll T'here are two important points to underline. On one hand, the Appellate Body emphasized the importance of the criteria of 'consumers' tastes and habits', explaining that: evidence relating, to consumers' tastes and habits would establish that the health risks associated with c:hrysotile asbestos fibres il({luence co/lsumers' behaviour with respect to the different fibres at issue ... Consumers' tastes and habits regarding .fibres. even in Lhe case ol' commercial parties, such as manufacturers, are very likely to be shaped by the health risks associated with a product which is known to be highly carcinogenic. A manufacturer cannot, for instance, ignore the prefcrenees of the ultimate consumer of its for hmm arising is widely recognized, such as through the unint(lntional introduction of a new aller9en or toxin, there is little evidence to call upon to support the claims of saf(0ty of GM foods', available at <http://wwwgenewatch.or9/WTO/Arnicus/PubliclntorostArnicus.pelf>. ""Ibid.
31 lt should be recalled that ttw general criteria for analysing like·· ness were essentially set out in the f.~eport of the Wori<inu Group on Bore/er Tax Adjustments, adopted on 2 December 19/0 (BISD 1 flS/ 1 05), also available at <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/ qattpanels/bordertax.pdf> Those criteria relate to: (i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end uses of ttw products; (iii) consumers' tastes and habits; and (iv) the tariff classification of the products. This approach hm; been followed and developed by rnany panels and by the Appellate f3ody. products. If the risks posed by a particular product are sufficiently great, the ultimate consumer may simply cease t·o buv lhnt product. '"' From that perspective, the Appellate Body judged that the 'risk' criterion (that is, health risks) is pertinent to the test of the likeness of products, thereby attenuating an exclusively 'economic' interpretation of likcness.:B Even if the degree of 'riskiness' of GM Os is not equivalent···-at least according to current seienec ··-to the degree of danger of asbestos, the scientific uncertainty that characterizes the risks linked to GMOs, nonetheless, justifies that GM Os should not be treated in a similar manner to non-GMO products. However, it is appropriate to consider the contrary hypothesis, which would be to conclude that the two categories are like products and, therefore, concomitantly, that Article III of GKJ~I' 1994 has been violated. Thus, we must examine whether the derogatory mechanism of Article XX of GATI' 1994 permits discrimination between C;JVI products and non-GM products.
IS DIFFERENT TREATMENT BETWEEN GMO AND NON~GMO PRODUCTS JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE XX OF GATT 1994?
Two subparagraphs of Article XX are particularly apposite to the analysis of Article XX: Article XX(b) and Article XX(g).
Article XX(b) provides for the possibility of restrictions on trade through measures that are 'necessary Lo protect human, animal or plant life or health'. In the interpretation of necessity, the ease law of dispute-settlement bodies under Gi\'I"f 1994 and the W'l'O has frequently emphasized the existence of one or more altemative measures to the initial restrictive measure which would permit the same health objectives to be attained.
In determining whether a suggested alternative measure is 'reasonably available', several factors must be taken into account, besides the difficulty of implementation. In 'f1wiland Restrictions on Importation qf'ond Intemul Tuxes on Cigarettes, the panel made the following observations on the applicable standard for evaluating whether a measure is 'necessary' under Arl:ide XX( b):
The import restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered to be 'neecssary' in terms of Article XX( h) only if :n The Appellate Body considers 'risk' to be a sub-criteri<1 that is transplanted onto thG examination of the criteria of 'properties of products' and/or t11e criteria of 'consumers' tastes and habits'. Ibid., para. 122.
there were no alternative measmc consistent with Lbe General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it which Thailand could reusmwhh; he expected to employ to ochieve its health policy o [Jjecliues-"' (emphasis added) In Koreu --iHeusures AJfecting Jrnports of Fresh. Chilled and Frozen Bec!f; the Appellate Body observed that one aspect of the 'weighing and balancing process ... comprehended in the determination of whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure' is reasonably available is the extent to which the alternative measure 'contributes to the realization of the end pursued'.:ls Furthermore, the Appellate Body stated that '[f]he more vital or important [the] common interests or values' pursued, the easier it would be to accept as ·necessary' measures designed to achieve those ends.:
Applying this reasoning to the Asbestos Case, the Appellate Body considered that the objective pursued by the French measure was the preservation of human life and health through the elimination, or reduction, or the well-known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibres, and thus concluded that the value pursued is both vital and important in the highest degree.:!? G1VIO regulations or measures related to GMOs aim, in principle, to protect the environment and health; from this perspective, they appear to pursue a 'vital and important common value'. 'J'he remaining question, then, is whether there is an alternative measure that vvould achieve the same end and that is less restrictive of trade than a stated measure on the import of GMOs. If not, we can conclude that the 'necessity' or the measure and the test of paragraph (b) of Article XX would be satisfied.
Article XX offers another track: that of paragraph (g), which authorizes the enactment of restrictive trade rneasures 'relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on dorncstic production or consumption·. The Appellate Body, by giving a broad interpretation to the concept of exhaustible natural resources, opened a gap in the WTO system. In the Shrimp Turtle Cuse, it considered that:
[t]cxtually, Article XX (g) is not limited to the conservation of 'mineral' or 'non--living' natural resources. We do not believe that 'exhaustible' natural resources and 'renewable' natural resources are mutually exclusive. One lesson that modern biological sciences teach us is that living species. though in prindple. capable of reproduction and, in that sense, 'renewable', are in certain circumstances indeed 
ISSUES ARISING FROM THE SPS AGREEMENT AND THE TBT AGREEMENT
Among the WTO agreements concerning restrictions on international trade of GMOs, two agreements are fundamental and inescapable: the SPS Agreement and the 'fBT Agreement. 'I'hese two agreements are at the centre of the lively controversy between the different parties to the EC Biotech Cuse as to the scope of the dispute.
IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SPS AND THE TBT IN THE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF 'SANITARY AND ENVIRONMENTAL' RISKS?
The most important question in the test for applicability of the SPS Agreement is whether GMO import regulations are only SPS measures within the meaning of the SPS (a) to protect animal or plant life or health withill the territory of the member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or diseasecausing organisms; (b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territmy of the member from risks arising ti·om additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstufJs; (c) to proteet human life or health within the territory of the member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the ent1y, establishment or spread of pests; or (cl) to prevent or limit other damage within the tcn·it-ory of the member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.
It is not necessary here to engage in the debate as lo whether the SPS Agreement depends on the effect of a measure or on the pmposes of that measure. The concept of object and purpose frequently encountered in Lreaty law illustrates that it would be almost impossible or even risky to seek to distinguish concretely between the purpose and the effect sought by a given rule or procedure.
The solution eonccrning the field of application of SPS measures must be sought as much in the TBT Agreement as in the SPS Agreement. Recognizing that no country should be prevented from tak-· ing measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment.
Second, the TBT Agreement enjoys a kind of 'residual competence', whereas the SPS Agreement has only it:s ·attributed competence'. 40 The field of application of the SPS Agreement is defined by a limitative enumeration of SPS measures. This is why it. would be inadequate to affirm absolutely that the SPS Agreement eovers environmental risk luto sensu. Trw SPS Agn'ement only covers environmental risk in a limited manner through phytosanitary considerations. The protection of plant life or health 'from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, cliscase-earrying organisms or disease-causing organisms" 11 constitutes as much a sanitary objective as an environmental one. Also, Article 5(2) of the SPS Agreement illustrates that the environmental risk is not something totally unknown in the framework of that Agreement:
[i]n the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and tesling methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest-or disease-free areas; relevant ecological und environmental conditions; and quarantine or other treatment. (emphasis added)
All other environmental risks come under the TBT Agreement.
Contrary to the claims of Argentina, Canada and the USA, the dispute on the de ./(1cto moratorium in the BC Biotech Case eannot be limited to the SPS Agreement nor ean it be conceived that the TBT Agreement is only concerned in a residual or alternative manner. 42 As the WTO Appellate Body affirmed in Koreu -Dairy Sqfeguul'ds, '[i] t is now well established that the WTO Agreement is a "Single Undertaking" and therefore all WTO obligations are generally cumulative and Members must comply with all of them sirnulLaneously'.' 1 :l
CAN SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY RELATED TO GMOS BE RECONCILED WITH THE SCIENTIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE SPS AGREEMENT?
Precaution is at the heart of EC legislation regarding GM Os, but also at the heart of international regulation ' 11 SF'S Aqreernent, Annex A, para. 1 (a -1996-4) . at 12: 'Unlil<e the previous GATT system, the WTO Agreomont is a single treaty instrument which was accepted by the WTO Members as a ··single undertakino'".
of GMOs.
·
1 Article 1 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety specifies that:
In accordance with the precaulionary approach ... the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modem biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to lnunan health .... "
"
The dispute-settlement bodies of the WT'O have, howevel', shown some reticence l'egarding the application of precaution in the settlement of the disputes of which they nre seized, because it is not expressly incorporated in the SI'S Agreement.
Although the WTO Appellate Body abstained from taking a position on the status of the precautionary principle and refused, as a result, to recognize its prevalence in the rights and obligations contained in the W'l'O Agreements -and particularly the SPS Agreement -it has considered it as a principle contained in the corpus juris in force within the WTO, i.e. in Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement.
16 Artide 5(7) functions as 'a qualified exemption' 47 of the obligation stated in Article 2(2) of the SPS Agreement'w not to maintain SPS measures without sufficient scientific evider1ce. However, this exemption treatment renders the ambit of precaution rather limited in the framework of the wro. It is sufficient to refer to the ·"' Biosafety Protocol, n. 18 above. Article 10, para. 6 states that:
'Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified OI'(Janism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of irnport, takino also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with reqmcl to the import of the livinq modified orqanism in question . in order to avoid or minimize such potontial adverse effects'. Within the WTO, each State can make use of its own law to determine the level of protection of the environment or health that it deems appropriate. Consequently, it may apply measures, including measures founded on preeaution, which carry a higher level of protection than that founded in relevant international standards or recommendations. Nonetheless, the obligation of 'objective' assessment of risk persists even in the context of scien tiGc uncertainty.
Precaution has a triple dimension. It requires that a 'methodology of precaution' be applied to the whole process of analysis of enviromncntal or sanitary risk, which consists of three stages: evaluation, management and communication. This may seem contrary to WTO law having regard, for example, to paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement, which requires that an assessment of risks related to phytosanitary measLtres must deal with the 'probability' of the entry, establishment or spread of the disease. As the Appellate Body specified, the assessment of 'probability' "'In the .Japan ·-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products Case, the Appellate Body observed that Article 5(7) sots out four requirements that must be satisfied in order for a measure to be justified. Those requirements, which are cumulative, are the following: if the moasum is (i) imposed in respHct of a situation whore 'relevant scientific information is insufficient'; (ii) adopted 'on the basis of available pertinent information'. Pursuant to the second sentence of Article 5(7). such a provisional moasure rnay not be maintained unless the rnomber that adopted the measure (iii) 'seol\[s] to obtain the additional information necessary for a rnoro objective assossmont of risk '; and (iv) Nevertheless, some elements militate in favour of an application of precaution in the treatment of risk by the WTO. The Panel charged with the Asbestos Cuse admitted that it is not possible to require a level of absolute certainty from a member who wishes to invoke Artiele XX of GATT 1994. It stated: 'to make the adoption of health measures concerning a definite risk depend upon establishing with certainty a risk ... would have the effect of preventing any possibility of legislating in the field of public health'.":' The interpretation by the dispute-settlement bodies of the scope of risk assessment constitutes another factor favouring the acceptance of a precautionary treatment of risk in the WTO framework. The Austruliu --Nleasw·es A:f.lecting Importation of Salmon Case provided an opportunity for the Appellate Body to explain that 'the ''risk'' evaluated in a risk assessment must be an aseer . . . tainable risk ... This does not mean, however, that a Member cannot determine its own appropriate level of protection to be "zero risk'". 54 Finally, the evaluation of risk on which a measure is based can ineludc unquantifiable data of a factual or qualitative nature and is not exelusively limited to purely quantitative scientific data. This interpretation was confirmed in the Hormones Cuse by the Appellate Body of the WTO, which rejected the initial interpretation of the Panel, according to which the evaluation of risk would have to be quantitative and establish a minimum level of risk. Do these openings enable us to affirm that scientific uncertainty has a place at the WTO'? Scientific uncertainty governs er: cmte the invocation of precaution. The recognition of these criteria by the WTO remains hazy and 'relative·. In the report of the Appellate Body in the Honnones Cuse, it was recalled that 'responsible and representative governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources'."" The Appellate Body stated in the Asbestos Case that: Precaution is thus not necessarily exercised on the basis of scientific majority opinion. It grants significant weight to minority scientific opinion, as long as such opinion is serious and respected. Scientific uncertainty rnay be given considerable legitirnaey at the WTO.
Nonetheless, we must keep this concept in perspective given the difficulty for the criteria of scientific uncertainty to be established on the basis of Article 5(7) of the SPS Agreement, the latter constituting the prirnaty reeeptade of precaution in the W'I'O. In the recent Japun Measures r\ll(~cling lhe Importation qf Apples Cuse, the Appellate Body concluded that:
[t]he application of Artiele 5 (7) is triggered not by the existence of scientific uncertainty, but rather by the insufficiency of scientific evidence. The text of Article 5 (7) is clear: it refers to ·cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient', not to 'scientific uncertainty'. 'fhe two coneepts are not interchangeable. Therefore, we are unable to endorse .Japan's approach of interpreting Article 5(7) through the prism of 'scientific uncertainty'.
ISSUES ARISING FROM THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY
SHOULD WTO AGREEMENTS BE READ IN 'CLINICAL /SOLATION' FROM THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL?
The elaboration of the legal regime applieable to GM Os was completed in stages. The adoption, in 1992, of the programme of action in Agenda 21'; 8 advocated the development of international cooperation on 'biosafety'. T'he Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted in 1992, foresaw the elaboration of a protocol ''" SefJ Asbestos Case, n. 32 abovfJ, para. 17B. in this area.';" The adoption of a protocol dedicated to these issues was rapidly envisaged, but several years of :mi11o11s 11P)';ntiatinns wPrP nPrf'SSHty in nrcler to ~liTiVf' at it. 1'he Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted on 29 January 2000. On the whole, its contents seem rather protective, in accordance with the wishes of the EU and developing countries. Among the noteworthy advances made by the Protocol are the eonferral of a broad field of application; the establishment of an advanee informed agreement procedure (as noted above) that permits a State to refuse to import a GJ\tlO; the acquisi Lion by the precautionary principle of an operational character; and the creation of the obligation to label GMOs. The Protocol also takes into con· sideration the needs of developing countries and is aimed at strengthening or developing their 'capacities' with regard to biosafety. At the same time, the adopted text reflects compromises. Some lack of precision or lacunae occur in the text as concessions to GMO exporter countries. There are many problems to resolve before the Protocol can be effectively implemented and fulftl the rather ambitious objectives that have been assigned to it. Moreover, on a universal level, international trade in GMOs must also be considered with regard to WTO law. Until the entry into force of the Protocol, W'I'O law was the only applicable law. Since the entry into force of the Protocol on Ll September 2003, the two legal systems apply concomitantly.r,o However, they answer to rather different logic: to facilitate free trade on one hand, and, on the other, to make it safe, if necessary by restricting it for environmental or health reasons. 'I'he faet that trade in GMOs is treated in parallel in the context of the Biodiversity Convention system and in the WTO system may cause some diffi .. culty in the interplay between the regimes.
The definition of the field of application rutionc muteriue of the Protocol was among the key stakes of the negotiations. Some wished that it would only address GMOs destined to be introduced into the environment, such as seeds, which alone are capable of threatening the environment and biodiversity. Others envisioned a much vaster field of application, embracing, aside from agricultural products, CMOs used for human or animal food, directly or after transformation, and GMOs used for medicine. In the end, an intermediate solution was accepted.
'"' See Convention on Biological Diversity (f\io de Janeiro, 5 June '1992), Article ·t9, para 3: 'The Parties shall consider the need for and rrtodalities of a protocol setting out appropriat(l procedures, including, in particulc1r, mJvance informed agroement. in the field of the safe transfer, hancllinq and use of any living modified orqanisrrt resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation <md sustainable use of bioloqical diversity·. 6 " The Biosafety Protocol has not been ratified by all State members of the WTO. in particular by the USA, which remains one of the principal protagonists in the field of trade in GMOs. 
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The Protocol does not use the usual expression of genetically modified organism, but rather prefers, as noted nbnve, thP exprr•s.sion 'living modified organisms' (LMOs) defined as 'any living organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern biotechnology'.
61 The concept of genetic modification is difficult to discern, and, here, there is recourse to biotechnical techniques that enable the definition of modified organisms. A living organism is 'any biological entity capable of transferring or replicating genetic material, including sterile organisms, viruses and viroicls'.w By 'living', the Protocol thus means active biological products, such as seeds and untransformecl agricultural products destined for human or animal alimentation (cereals). Derivative products, such as oil or flour, tomato sauce, eggs from hens fed with transgenic corn that cannot reproduce or transfer genetic material, arc thus exeluded from the application of the Protocol.
The Biosafety Protocol governs the international trade of GMOs without, however, clearly defining its relationship to the WTO Agreements.
:
1 'l'he limitations of the Biosafety Protocol were intentionally specified in the Preamble of the text itself: ' [e] 
mphusizing that this Pmtocol shell/ not be interpreted os implying u change in the rights and obliyations of a Party under any existing interrwtionul agreements' even though it also states that 't.rode and environment agreements should be muluully supportive with o uiew to uchieuing sustainable deuelopment' (emphasis added).
In the face of such provisions, how should the WTO dispute-settlement bodies react?
64 A priori, Artiele 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 6 '; cannot apply because the Protocol itself denies expressis verbis that it is a lex specialis in the <;o Biosafety Protocol, n. 18 above, Article 3. '"Ibid .. Article 3(g). Accordinq to Article 30, para. 2: '[w]hen a treaty specifies t11at it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible witll, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail'. Likewise, Article 30, para. 3 poses problems of application given that it provides that 'when all the pmties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation ... the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions me compatible with Utose of the later treaty'.
sphere of international trade law.M' Can the WTO disputc-·scttlemcnt bodies nonetheless take inspiration from the provisions of the Protocol at the risk of attenuating the scope of the W'fO Agreements? The hesitation, if not manifest reticence, of the WTO dispute-settlement bodies to take into account agree·-ments negotiated outside of the WTO leaves some doubt as to the applicability ipso jure of some international <~nvironmcntal protection instrun1cnts containing trade measures, including the Biosafety Protocol.
61
The dispute-settlement bodies arc reticent to have systematic recourse to international treaty and customary law,t> 8 insofar as the WTO agreements constitute a lex speciulis in relation to general international law.
69
'fhis status of lex speciulis in the international legal order and, by extension, the limited competenee of dispute-settlement bodies, must, nonetheless, be put into perspective. 'T'he WTO dispute-settlement mechanism is not a hennetie systcn1 and is not 'hostile' to general international law. 70 As the Appellate Body solemnly affirmed in the first ease that came before it,n 'the General Agreement is not to be read in elinieal isolation from public internationallaw'. The regirnH of WTO agreHrrwnts has boon identified in some mspHcts as a 'self-contained regime'. Consequently, it contEiins rules th<1t are specific to the WTO system, which can derogate frorn general international law. The derogatory nature does not, however, entail total isolation frorn the system of international law. On this issue, see Ltd. 2004. agreements in nccordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. However, the relationship of the WTO Agreements to customary international lavv is broader than this. Customary international law applies generally to the economic relations between the wro Members. Such international law npplies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do not 'contract out' from it. To pul it nnother way, to the extent there is no conflict or inconsistency, or nn expression in a covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of the view that the customary rules of international law apply to the WTO treaties and lo ih(' process of treaty formation under the WTO.''"
The applicability of the Biosafety Protocol to a dispute already at the WTO cannot be exeludecF 4 " See also DSU. Article 13(2), according to which 'panels may seek information frorn any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of thH matter'. Likewise, SPS Agroomont, ArticiH 11 (2) states that '[i]n a dispute under this Agree·· ment involving scientific or technical issuHs, a panel should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to the dispute. To this encl. the panel may, when it cleerns it appropriate. establish an advisory technical experts group. or consult the relevant international or9anizations. at the request of either party to tho dispute or on its own initiative'. Lhe protection and conservation of highly migratory species of sea turtles ... demands concerted and cooperative efforts on the part of many countries whose waters are tra .. versed in the comse of reeurrenl sea turtle migrations. The need for and the appropriateness of such efforts have been recognized in the WTO itself as well as in a significant number of other international instruments and declarations ... Of particular relevance is Principle l2 of the Rio Declaration on Enviwnmenl: and Development, which states, in part: 'Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.' Clearly, and as filr as possible, a multilateral approach is strongly preferred.'.'n One cannot deny that the Biosafety Protocol is truly the result of multilateral negotiations on a sensitive subject ... that of CM Os. It is an instrument of consensus, and, moreover, an instrument preventing any In order for the Biosafety Protocol to find application in the WTO, the concept of 'mutual supportiveness' should be promoted by the WTO dispute-settlement bodies. In this context, the Biosafety Protocol should be read as implying the principle of mutual snpportiveness, in particular with the WTO agreements.ao In order to maintain this mutual supportivencss, each framework should remain responsible and competent for the issues falling within its primary area of competence.
LAUF-IENCE BOISSON DE CIIAZOUNNES AND MAKANE MOi'SE MBENGUE
The fact that the mentioned regimes should each focus on their primary competence does not mean, however, that the WTO agreements cannot deal with principles and rules that affeet the Biosafety PJ'(Jtocol. Ht More generally, there is an emerging and rather consistent practice in favour of mutual supportiveness in regulating the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements and WTO Agreements to be taken into aeeount by the panels or the Appellate Body. 7BT Agreement, GATT 1994) and the Protocol, that tt1e two instruments are complementary, and that the Protocol's provisions on precaution and risk assessment inform the meanin9 and effect of the relevant provisions in the WTO anreements. The nenotiators of the Biosafety Protocol were acutely aware of its relationship with WTO anreements and cannot have intended that thme should be an inconsistency of approach. Reasom1ble qovernments have concluded that the authorization of GMOs (including import requirements) requires a particular approach, and they can hardly have intended that approach to be inconsistent with WTO rulos. The E'uropean Community submits that the application of its internal rner:Jsures is fully consistent with the WTO a9reements, and that this is confirmed by the requirements of the E3iosafety Protocol'. identif.i; the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread a Member wants to prevent within its territory, as well as the potential biological and economic consequences associated with tile entry, establishment or spread of these diseases; evaluate the likelihood of the entry, establishment and spread of these diseases, as well as the associated potential biological and economic eonsequenc:es.B 7 (emphasis added)
The Appellate Body specified that:
for a risk assessment to fall within the meaning of Article 5(1) and the first definition in paragraph 4 of Annex A, it is not sufiieient that a risk assessment conclude that there is a possibility of entry, establishment or spread of diseases and associated biological and economic consequences. A proper risk assessment of this type must evaluate the 'like· lihoocl', i.e., the 'probability', of entry, establishment or spread of diseases and associated biological and economic eonsequences ... ""(emphasis added)
The Biosafety Protocol also requires these two preliminary steps. According to paragraph 8(a) and (b) of Annex III relating to risk assessment, a risk assessment entails an 'identification of any novel genotypic and phenotypic characteristics associated with Lhe living modified organism that may have adverse effects on biological diversity in the likely potential receiving environment, tal.::ing also into account risks to human health' and 'an evaluation of the likelihood of these adverse effects being realized, taking into account the level and kind of exposure of the likely potential receiving environment to the living modified organism'. the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, takinp also into account risks to hurnan health'. See also ibid., Article 16. para. 1 on risk manapement, according to which 'the Parties shall . establish and maintain appropriate mechanisms, measures and strategies to requlate, mam19e and control risks identified in the risk assessment provisions of this Protocol associated with the use, t1andlinp and transboundary movement of living modified or\)anisrns'. there is nothing to indicate that the listing of factors that may be taken into account in a risk assessment of Article fi(2) was intended to be a closed list. It is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be evaluated in a risk assessment under Article 5(1) is not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating under strictly con trolled conditions, but also risk in human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world where people live and work and die. ''" [n this way, the Appellate Body introduced some softness into the justification of measures taken in the name of protecting the environment and public health. The Appellate Body confirmed this position in the Europecm Corrununities -Measures Ajfectiny Asbestos unci Asbestos-Containing Products Case, concluding that a risk can be assessed from a quantitative or qualitative perspective.'H It thus clarified the scope and content of Article XX( b) of GA'IT 1994 by stating that: ' .. , as with the SPS Agreement, there is no requirement under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 to qwmlift;, as such, the risk to human life or health' (emphasis added).% Thus, the Appellate Body indicated the willingness of WTO dispute-settlement bodies-indeed, to a reasonable and doubtless minimal degree -to take into account sodetal aspirations when it comes to risk rnanagement. Issues that do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis by means of laboratory methods of empirical or experimental research commonly assoeiated with the physical sciences cannot be excluded from risk assessment.
The Biosafety Protocol could find an entry way into the WTO and play a key role in a dispute concerning risk assessment linked to GM Os. Indeed, according to Article 26, paragraph 1 of the Protocol: the Parties, in reaching a decision on import ... may take into account, consistent with their international obligations, socioeconomic considerations arising from the impact of living modified organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to indigenous and local communities.
The provisions of the Biosafety Protocol and the case law of the WTO dispute-settlement bodies relating to the SPS Agreement obey a common logic for risk assessment. Schematically, four key steps must be respected: the identification of a hazard; 9 r' its en lbid, para. Hl7. ""See Asbestos Case, n. 32 above, para. 1 Gl. charaeterization; 0 ' evaluation/ appraisal of exposure;"H and the eharacterization of the risks.9 9 Ilowever, the Biosafety Protocol aims to n~gulate more broadly than the SPS Agreement, in the sense that it contains provisions relating to risk management.
100 The WTO case law does not establish, in an absolute manner, the applieability of the SPS Agreement with regard to risk managerncnt.
101 Each WT'O Member State is free to determine the level of acceptable protection before proceeding to risk assessment. w:>.
GMOS, ISSUES OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE WTO DISPUTE-SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE
Gl\;IOs give rise to many soc:ietal and public: interest issues on whieh international civil society wants itself to be heard. The WTO dispute-settlement system., however, is traditionally based on a certain degree of opacity clue to the intergovernmental charaeter of its procedures. Only States have locus stmuii in the WTO dispute-settlement procedure. The proceedings before the panels and the Appellate Body are not publie. The media, representatives of non-government organizations (NGOs) and other interest groups are not permitted to attend. However, the Appellate Body has attenuated the intergovernmental nature of the dispute-resolution system by admitting submissions from amici curiae, that is to say, by enabling non-State aetors to present '"The characterization of hazard 'has as its goal the determination of the natum and severity of toxic offocts for health or for the environm@t. .· (authors' translation). Ibid., at 398.
"'' The exposure assessment seeks to deterrninH 'how at-risk groups <md diffemnt components of the environment will be exposed to t11o effects of the substance or agent' (authors' translation). Ibid .. at 399. "''The characterization of tho risk 'consists of detGrmining ... Hm probability of the fmquency and tliG wavily of the known or potential nefarious effects of the agent or the substance on the environrnt)nt or health' (authors' translation). Ibid., at 399. "'" Risk management can extend to the adoption of legislative or regulatory measures concerning the risk in question and refers even more fundamentally to the determination, on the bc1sis of assessment results, of an acceptable level of risk (authors' translation). lbicl, at 405···A16. "'' We coulcl, however, consider that the SPS Agreement, Article 5(3) deals witl1 risk mana9ernent. That Article reads as follows: 'In assessing the risk to anirnal or plant life or health anc1 determining the measure to be applied for achieving the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection from such risk. Members shall take into account as relevant economic factors: the potential clamage in tmms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a post or disease; the costs of control or eradication i11 the territory of the importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness of altorm1tivo approaches to limiting risks'. ""' D.K. para. 12, Canada's representative, for instance. questioned 'whether the general authority under Article 17.9 of the DSU to draw up working procedures provided a sufficient leqal basis for the Appellate Body to accept and consider amiws curiae briefs ... the Appllllate Body had provided no guidance as to when, in futuro cases, it would be prepared to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs ... by explicitly rocognizinq that it had to act consistently with the DSU provisions, the Appellate Body seernecl to have precluded its consideration of amicus curiae briefs that contained now facts, or that sought to re-argue issues of facts already decided by the Panel. To do otherwise would contravene Article 17.G of the DSU, which limited the jurisdiction of the Appellate Body to issues of law ... the Appellate Body's reasons did not specifically address whether it could consider factual information contained in an amicus curiae submission. The Appellate Body's decision on this critical issue was more than a matter of procedure. it higl1liqhted the need for Members to decide and clarify, in the DSU rules. whether amicus curiae briefs should be permitted and, if so, under what conditions ... the issue of amicus curiae briefs raised many complex and controversial issues which could not be resolved at the present meeting. Those issues wore of systemic concerTI and. as such. should only bo addressed by fvlornbors'. For rnoro details. see L. Boisson de Chazournes and fvl.M. Mbengue, n. 103 a bOW\ 225--226.
civil sodety. 110 The WTO dispute-settlement bodies should not allow themselves to be left behind and should, in this context, give more weight to communications from non-State actors. This perspective will contribute to increase public support for their decisions.
CONCLUSION
The questions regarding the international trade of GMOs and related disputes are complex because of their multifaceted character and because of their public interest nature. GMO issues cover various areas of regulation such as trade, environment, heallh, development or human rights. They involve multiple actors, including States, international organizations, NGOs, the private sector, the seientific community and individuals.
In this context, is the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism the most suited forum for deciding such complex issues'? Doubts have been expressed about any u pri-· ol'i determination by the WTO of the forum under which a dispute involving WTO rights and obligations should be handled. Some stress the importance of WTO members maintaining their right to submit any conflict involving trade measures to WTO dispute settlement. Thus, they are of the view that the WTO remains authoritative to deal with a conflict arising ti·om the use of any trade measure independently of its policy objective, even if it is environmental or sanitary.
111
One should remember that in its first report, the Committee on 'frade and Environment (C'I'E) addressed the question of the choice of the dispute-settlement forum. It distinguished between disputes in which the WTO rnembers involved are parties to an MEA and disputes in which some W'I'O Members are not party to an M.EA. For the first category of disputes, the CTE recognized that: WTO .1Vlembers have not resorted to WTO dispute settlement with a view to undermining the obligations they nccepted by becoming Parties to an MEA, and the CTE considers that this will remain the case. While WTO Members have the right to bring disputes to the wro dispute settlement mechanism, if a dispute arises between WTO Members, Parties to an Ml•:A, over the use of trade measures they are applying between themselves pursuant to the MEA. they should consider trying to resolve it through the dispute settlement mechanisms available under the MEA. In the case of a dispute related to GMOs, this would lead us to consider that, if the WTO members are par·· ties to the Cartagena Protocol, the best solution would be to bring the dispute under the proeedurcs provided for by the Cartagcna Protocol.
However, when the dispute involves non-parties to an M.EA as in the L\C Biotech dispute -the USA and Australia have not ratified the Cartagena Protocol then the CTE advocated an intermediary solution:
. the WTO would provide the only available dispute settlement mechanism sincc the non-party would have no rights under, nor access to, the 1VIEA dispute settlement mechanism. In such circumstances, it would be important for the DSB to avoid becoming involved in pure environmental conflicts, but u WTO dispute sett/emelll panel could seek releuont environmental expertise and tee/mica/ advice. m (emphasis added)
This last sentence may be very meaningful. It tends Lo suggest that the multifaceted charaeter and the different interests involved in GMO disputes will more ""Ibid., para. 3fl. Both are involved in a research programme in the domain of trade and environment. it focuses on the rnultilateral regulation of agrobiodivesity and biotechnology, and it is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
